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Abstract: The paper empirically examines the relationship between trade openness and the level of
corruption in Pakistan using annual time-series data for the period 1984 to 2007. The
analysis shows that trade openness negatively affects corruption in Pakistan. The results are
robust to controlling for other corruption determining variables and various model
specifications. Sensitivity analysis shows that economic development and political
liberalization reduce corruption levels. Other explanatory variables i.e. human and physical
capital, government expenditures, population, inflation and defense expenditures
significantly affect corruption in the expected directions.
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Introduction
Economists, historians and political scientists have long been engaged in a debate as
to whether, and to what extent trade openness affects economic activity. The
prevailing view is that openness boosts economic activity by efficient allocation of
resources in the economy. Theoretical literature has underlined several channels
through which openness affect economic growth. Corruption is one such channel
through which trade openness affects income. According to the World Bank (2000),
corruption originates mainly for three reasons: (a) lack of meritocracy in the civil
service; (b) absence of political rights and civil liberties; and (c) overly restrictive
regulations and high degrees of state ownership. Trade restrictions (openness) form
part of the third category of problems. In fact, the causal relationship between trade
openness and corruption is not as simple as it seems to be. One strand of thought
argues that chain of causality runs from corruption to trade. Lambsdorff (1998), Lee
and Azfar (2003) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) describe how corruption
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reduces international trade, because exporters and importers are discouraged by a
system of bribery, uncompetitive bidding, selective taxation and artificially created
monopolies. According to this view, to increase international trade, one must reduce
the level of corruption.2
The second strain of thought reverses the chain of causality and argues that it is
trade openness that affects the level of corruption. According to Bonaglia et al.
(2001) there are three identified channels through which trade openness affects
corruption: (a) fewer and less stringent trade restrictions (Krueger, 1974; Gatti,
1999); (b) increased foreign competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1995, 1999); and
increased foreign investment (Wei, 2000a, 2000b; Larraín and Tavares, 2004).
Krueger (1974) argues that trade openness (e.g. removal of quotas) reduces the rent
seeking activities in the country and thereby leads more trade. Similarly, Ades and Di
Tella (1999) point that corruption tends to be higher if companies enjoy rents due to
protection from competition from imports either on a natural (through large distance
to other markets) or a political way (through trade policy). The monopolistic power
of companies and officials is diminished through increased competition. In addition
to direct effects, trade openness also affects corruption indirectly. For instance, trade
openness affects growth, investment, poverty, income inequality, and democratic
institutions – factors which in turn have an impact on corruption (Wei, 2000a;
Treisman, 2000; Larraín and Tavares, 2004; Winters 2004; Uslaner, 2005).
According to these views, trade openness reduces corruption. Authors like Leff
(1964), Huntington (1968) and Lui (1985) viewed corruption as ‘grease in the
wheels’ of commerce and trade, proposing scenarios where corruption may allow
entrepreneurs to work around extensive bureaucratic procedures. Thus, according to
this view trade openness increases the level of corruption. The grease theory,
however, has now lost most proponents as more and more evidence come to light
showing that corruption in fact is much more like sand than grease, leading to
economic inefficiencies (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999).
In empirical literature, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that countries that are
more open to trade are also less plagued by corruption (Krueger, 1974; Ades and Di
Tella, 1999; Larrain and Tavares, 2004; Wei, 2000a; Bonaglia et al., 2001; World
Bank, 2000; Sandholtz and Koetzle; 2000; Treisman, 2000; Giavazzi and Tabellini,
2004; Gatti, 2004; Chaudhary, 2005). However, Torrez (2002) argues that empirical
evidence supporting negative relationship between corruption and openness does not
hold for all the datasets available. In his study the results seem to depend on the
choice of the corruption index. The same thing goes for Gerring and Thacker (2005)
and Knack and Azfar (2003), but they underscore that this may be due to sample
selection bias. To conclude, depending on the coverage in space and time, the choice
of corruption measurement and the definition of openness, the scholars come to
different conclusions.
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An important reason for getting muddled results regarding the effect of trade
openness on corruption may be that the existing studies are limited only to cross
section and panel data analysis, while individual country studies may give clear
picture. This is what the present paper attempts to do. Pakistan initiated the strategy
of trade openness in 1980s, which generally remained successful. Thus, there is a
possibility that in the short to medium term, corruption may be significantly affected
by successful trade liberalization policies is Pakistan. This stimulates us to
empirically examine the effect of trade openness on corruption in Pakistan. For this
purpose, the paper utilizes annual time series data for the period 1984 to 2007. To my
knowledge this study is going to be the first study to address this issue in a rigorous
way in Pakistan.
Analytical Framework
This section explores the link between trade openness and corruption using
regression analysis. The approach followed here is to add trade openness variable to
the right-hand-side explanatory variables in a standard corruption equation as an
explanatory variable. Here the hypothesis is that trade openness variable is likely to
significantly negatively affect corruption. In order to be consistent with previous
studies, I utilize a conventional model. In what follows we estimated the model given
by:
where the lowercase letters denote that the underlying variables are in natural log
form. Various variables are defined as follows:
CORt = Corruption Index
opent = Trade openness
hct = Human capital
g t = Government consumption
popt = Population
INFt = Inflation rate
k t = Capital stock per worker
def t = Defense Expenditures
 t = White-noise error term
where's are the parameters to be estimated, and t is the stochastic disturbance term
such that  t N~ ( , )0
2 .











Corruption is posited to be function of a set of control variables. These control
variables include human capital, physical capital, government expenditures,
population, inflation, and defense expenditures. Changes in any of these control
variables would be expected to alter corruption.3
Data and Empirical Results
Overview of the Data
Annual time-series data is collected for Pakistan for the period 1984 to 2007. Some
variables are directly taken from the data source. These variables include corruption,
population, inflation, democracy, political constraints and government stability.
Corruption is measured as an index ranging from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating
more corruption and the data is taken from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Democracy is proxied by Polity2 score, which is taken from Polity IV dataset
described by Marshall and Jaggers (2009), Polity2 is an index ranging from -10 (full
autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). Political constraint is proxied by
POLCONV score, which is taken from POLCON dataset described by Henisz.
POLCONV is an index ranging from 0 (no constraints on executive’s powers) to 1
(full constraints on executive’s powers). Government stability is measured as an
index ranging from 0 to 12, with higher values indicating high government stability
and the data source is ICRG. The remaining variables are constructed using
secondary data. For openness measure, I use the share of total trade (exports plus
import) in GDP. Per capita income is real GDP per capita; human capital is defined as
secondary school enrollment rate; physical capital is proxied by gross fixed capital
formation as a share of GDP; government expenditure excludes defense and
education expenditures and is taken as share of GDP; while defense expenditure is
calculated as share of military spending in GDP. The data is taken from International
Financial Statistics, Pakistan Economic Survey and Pakistan Demographic Survey.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in this study, which will
help us in the interpretation of the coefficient estimates by providing the scale of the
relevant variables. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables. Column
(1) of Table 2 correlates corruption with all independent variables. The value of
correlation coefficient -0.40 indicates that corruption is negatively correlated with
trade openness. This suggests that trade openness is an important determinant to deter
corruption. Figure 1 plots the simple regression between corruption and trade
openness. The figure displays an apparent negative relationship between corruption
and trade openness for Pakistan. The simple regression exercises, being essentially
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bivariate and simplistic, calls for exploration in a more rigorous framework. This is
what the next section of the paper attempts to do.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Variables (1984 – 2007)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Count
Corruption 0.55 0.50 0.14 0.33 1.00 24
Openness
(% of GDP)
31.19 30.60 2.42 28.12 36.46 24
Per Capita
Income (log)
10.13 10.16 0.11 9.88 10.30 24
Human
Capital (log)
0.31 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.41 24
Govt. Exp.
(% of GDP)
0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07 24
Population
(log)
4.84 4.84 0.18 4.52 5.13 24
Inflation
(%)








5.79 6.21 1.74 3.46 7.86 24
Democracy 0.79 -4.00 6.64 -7.00 8.00 24
Political
Constraints
0.22 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.76 24
Govt.
Stability
7.45 8.13 2.49 2.17 10.83 24
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Table 2: Correlation Table for the Variables Included in the Regressions (1984 –
2007)








Govt. Exp. -0.04 0.19 0.45 0.49
Population 0.08 -0.02 0.97 0.84 0.43
Inflation -0.34 0.74 -0.10 0.09 0.02 -0.32
Physical
Capital
0.11 0.46 -0.03 0.22 0.13 -0.18
Defense
Exp.
-0.25 0.34 -0.82 -0.62 -0.30 -0.93
Democracy -0.54 0.74 -0.11 0.08 0.22 -0.32
Political
Constraints
-0.53 0.80 0.04 0.18 0.02 -0.18
Govt.
Stability
-0.01 -0.41 0.56 0.38 -0.10 0.68
Figure 1: Simple Regression between Corruption and Trade Openness (1984 – 2007)
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3.2. Empirical Analysis
In this section we present estimates of the impact of trade openness on the level of
corruption, after controlling for several other indicators. If corruption and openness
are jointly determined, then one cannot provide a causal interpretation to the OLS
estimates. Moreover, since corruption is only imperfectly measured, the OLS
estimates suffer from attenuation bias as well as simultaneously bias. Both biases can
be addressed if we use an appropriate instrumental variable estimator like
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
Table 3 presents the estimates for the effect of trade openness on corruption using
GMM estimator.4 The most parsimonious specification includes just the openness
variable. However, we have added a broad set of controls suggested in the literature
on the determinants of corruption. The regressions show that trade openness has
significant negative effect on corruption or that the more liberal the trade regime, the
lower is the level of corruption. It can be reasonably hypothesized that lower tariff
and non-tariff barriers lead to fewer opportunities for rent seeking (in terms of taking
bribes for lower tax payments or exemptions). Not only do the opportunities for
rent-seeking decrease, but the increased competitiveness of the economy that results
from trade liberalization leads to lower available rents. The effect is also
economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in openness (2.42) leads
to a decrease in corruption of about 0.49 points as of column (1). The coefficient on
corruption is also robust as suggested by various equation specifications. In sum,
there is robust evidence of a beneficial impact of trade openness on the level of
corruption. As to the general fit of the regression, our different specifications explain
between 25 and 75 percent of the total variation in corruption.
Other variables also turn out to be important determinants of corruption level.
More educated population is predicted to have lower levels of perceived corruption.
It is seen that corruption is significantly affected by the size of the government. The
results imply that an economy with larger government has a tendency to be more
susceptible to corruption. This is because a larger government implies an increased
number of rules and regulations, including licenses, permits and authorizations of
various types. The resulting monopoly power of the state enables it to extract illegal
rents or to engage in other acts of corruption. Corruption also increases with the
increase in population level, while an increase in inflation reduces corruption.
Further, we observe that physical capital accumulation breeds corruption in the
country. It indicates that capital formation in the country provides opportunities for
corruption. Moreover, corruption increases with military spending. However, this
result is not robust with alternative equation specifications.
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Sensitivity Analysis
The Role of Economic Development
Generally, it is argued that corruption decreases with the level of economic
development (Treisman, 2000; Ades and Di Tella; 1999). The intuition is that
corruption is a symptom of a strong economy and that economies that are growing
faster are indicating that they have greater institutional strengths, which in turn
should be reflected by lower levels of corruption. To check this hypothesis we
include per capita income in our benchmark specification as a proxy measure for
economic development.
The simple correlation coefficient between per capita income and corruption
show that higher level of income is associated with lower level of corruption (see
Table 2). However, the negative correlation is stronger between openness and
corruption than between the latter and per capita income – respectively -0.40 and
-0.04. Table 4 provides the estimated results of per capita income. The results in
column (2)5 show that the effect of economic development on corruption is negative.
Although this result is statistically significant but economically it is weak. A one
standard deviation increase in per capita income (0.11) decreases corruption by 0.01
points. This is a very minute effect. A comparison of the effect of a standard deviation
increase in openness and in income per capita is illuminating: they lead to a decrease
of 0.49 and 0.01 points in corruption, respectively. Given the difficulty of increasing
the average level of country’s GDP per capita compared with the relatively
straightforward policy of opening trade, this bodes well for the use of openness to
fight corruption. Including income per capita, however, has increased the size and
significance level of trade openness coefficient.
Table 4: Relationship Between Corruption and Openness: Inclusion of Per Capita
Income and Political Institutions (1984 to 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -2.529 -2.743 -4.691 -4.632 -4.871
(-2.533)* (-1.691)** (-2.480)* (-2.473)* (-2.257)*
Openness -0.204 -0.290 -0.133 -0.091 -0.137
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Human
Capital
-3.681 -5.193 -4.083 -3.921 -3.860
(-3.519)* (-2.732)* (-2.632)* (-2.850)* (-2.756)*
Govt. Exp. 0.430 0.483 0.368 0.356 0.352
(1.981)** (3.475)* (3.457)* (2.721)* (2.383)*
Population 2.276 2.735 2.651 2.642
(4.106)* (3.512)* (3.894)* (3.898)*
Inflation -0.074 1.418 0.819 0.672 0.685
-(0.091) (0.999) (0.557) (0.539) (0.553)
Physical
Capital
1.308 1.232 1.256 1.211 1.165
(3.885)* (4.672)* (6.320)* (5.654)* (3.095)*
Defense Exp. 0.513 -0.076 0.682 0.620 0.580













R2 0.655 0.462 0.679 0.681 0.698
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.348 0.545 0.550 0.578
DW 1.751 2.336 1.775 1.773 1.786
Note: Values in parentheses denote underlying student-t values. The t statistics significant at 5 % and 10
% levels of significance are indicated by * and ** respectively.
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The Role of Political Institutions
It is also hypothesized that only countries that undertake trade liberalization in close
conjunction with political liberalization experience a reduction in corruption, since
free press, free speech and protection of civil liberties allows for more transparency,
making corrupt politicians accountable to voters (Treisman, 2000; Giavazzi and
Tabellini, 2004; Tavares, 2005). It seems as if the two processes are complementary
then trade reforms are not useful to reduce corruption unless there is some political
accountability as well. To check the effect of political liberalization on the level of
corruption democracy variable is used.
The simple correlation coefficient between corruption and democracy (-0.54)
shows that corruption decreases with political liberalization. A similar relationship
holds between corruption and other political variables (i.e. political constraint and
government stability) as the correlation coefficients of -0.53 and -0.01 indicate. The
empirical results also specify that political freedom reduces corruption. The results in
column (3) of Table 4 show that a one standard deviation increase in democracy
(6.64) reduces corruption by 0.02 points. This result is statistically significant but
economically it is very weak. See that, the effect of openness on corruption has
decreased from -0.204 to -0.133 with the inclusion of democracy variable. It supports
the findings of Lederman et al. (2005) that the effect of openness on corruption
diminishes when controlling for political institutions such as democracy,
parliamentary systems, freedom of the press, etc. Lederman et al. interpret this as
evidence that the institutions are determinants of both trade outcomes and corruption
levels. A similar interpretation holds for political constraints and government
stability variables. Putting high constraints on executive powers reduce corruption
levels and that a stable government reduces the opportunities for corruption as well.
Conclusion
This paper makes a systematic attempt to estimate the effects of trade openness on the
level of corruption for Pakistan using annual time-series data for the period 1984 to
2007. The results of this paper strongly point to a beneficial effect of country
openness on corruption. The evidence shows that higher levels of openness reduce
corruption, thus adding another argument for trade liberalization policies. The
association is statistically significant and economically important. These findings are
robust as the results do not depend on the addition of a number of other relevant
variables. The results imply that the most potent tools of trade liberalization in
combating corruption are the policies of lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers across
product categories. In this regard custom reforms are effective in combating
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corruption in the country. Increased level of education reduces corruption, which
indicates more resources needs to be devoted for human capital accumulation.
Similarly, government size needs to be curtailed to reduce opportunities for
corruption. Moreover, government needs to check its physical capital accumulation
and military spending to combat corruption.
Corruption also decreases with the level of economic development. However, the
effect of openness on corruption is greater as that of income per capita on corruption.
This is important since a policy of trade openness is more easily pursued than a
general policy of raising the economy’s average income. Corruption is reduced by
good democratic institutions as well. In this regard consideration should be given to
transparent institution building to deter corruption. Since relations between trade and
corruption are complex and ambiguous, the fight against corruption ought therefore
to be mainstreamed into all policy areas. Trade reform could not be a cure for
corruption as a stand-alone, only if it is supported by other economic, social and
political reforms.
In fact, corruption is a pervasive phenomenon, which is very difficult to extricate.
Therefore, the problem of corruption must be addressed in a wide framework. In this
regard, a promising avenue for future research may be analyzing the different
channels through which openness decreases corruption levels. Further, exchange rate
policies may have a substantial effect on corruption because they usually reduce the
black market premium, which should reduce corruption in the foreign exchange
market. These policies also promote trade, which in turn makes the economy more
competitive and reduces the level of illegal rents available. Some work needs to be
done on this issue as well.
NOTES
1 Author is graduate student at the Department of Economics, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad,
Pakistan. The views expressed in the paper are those of author and cannot be attributed to the university.
2 For details, see Bandyopadhyay and Roy (2007) and the articles there in.
3 For theoretically expected signs of these variables on corruption reader is referred to Seldadyo and De
Haan (2005).
4 Lagged values of the variables are used as instruments
5 Results in column (1) of Table 4 are basically the results of our benchmark equation as shown in
column (1) of Table 3. Here they are reproduced only for comparison purpose.
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